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Making Defect Perfection: Shakespeare and the One-Sex Model  
*Enacting Gender on the English Renaissance Stage*  
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I saw her once

Hop forty paces through the public street;

And having lost her breath, she spoke, and panted,

That she did make defect perfection,

And, breathless, powr breathe forth.

*Antony and Cleopatra*, 2.2.219-33

I take *Antony and Cleopatra* as my starting point because Shakespeare's language about Cleopatra here allows for—perhaps even encourage—the critical fantasy that he is redressing a gender injustice. Defect and perfection are not neutral terms, particularly in descriptions of women: they are conceptual tokens in a long-standing argument about woman's nature relative to man's, as Milton well knew when he had Adam call Eve "this fair defect of nature" after the Fall (*Paradise Lost*, 10.891-92). The sense that woman is a defective man—a kind of glitch in nature—s master plan, which was to produce men—is at least as old as Aristotle; we can hear its attenuated echoes in all language chat characterizes woman as privative, woman as lack.

This language is of course familiar in Shakespeare, particularly in the transvestite comedies, and it is always called on initially to secure gender difference. From Portia—s "they shall think we are accomplished / With that we lack" (*Merchant of Venice*, 3.4.61-62.)[1] to Violas "A little thing would make me tell them how much I lack of a man" (*Twelfth Night*, 3.4.282-83), lack registers the presence of the woman under the masculine costume by calling attention to what is absent in her. (The definition of woman as that which lacks man's "little thing" is so habitual that Shakespeare can afford to make an anatomical joke about it in *As You Like It*: after Rosalind swoons at the sight of Orlando's blood, Oliver says, "Be of good cheer, youth. You a man! You lack a man's heart," and the chastened Rosalind, no doubt thinking of another lack, answers, "I do so, I confess it" [4.3.164-66].) As soon as a woman puts on men's clothes in the comedies, she is compelled to remind us of what she does not have, as though the audience were in danger of forgetting: Hamlet, worrying over the issue of his own gender confusions,
reminds himself and us that what Ophelia has between her legs is "nothing" (Hamlet, 3.2.113-15).

But if the allusions to lack in Shakespeare's transvestite comedies serve initially to secure difference by registering the woman's presence under the masculine costume, they also serve to undermine that difference. The joke, of course, is that the "women" do not in fact lack anything: the transvestite comedies repair the "lack" in women at least in part by calling attention to the body of the boy actor who underwrites the representation of women on stage. When transvestite theater reaches what appears to be its full potential in transvestite comedy, that is, it tends to do away with the anxieties attendant on sexual difference by doing away with sexual difference: lack disappears because women disappear.[2]

It is frequently assumed that the evocation of the boy actor must always function thus; but the strategy of Antony and Cleopatra is, I want to argue, quite different.[3] When Cleopatra alludes to the boy actor playing her--"I shall see / Some squeaking Cleopatra boy my greatness/ I' th' posture of a whore" (5.2.219-21)--she does so not in order to repair a lack in herself by alluding to the presence of the boy underneath but in order to distance herself from his defective representation other decidedly female grandeur. It goes without saying, I think, that only a playwright supremely confident in his boy actor--s capacity to play a woman convincingly could risk these lines: they work only if we simultaneously see the boy actor speaking them and see the "real" woman who does not want to be playacted parodically by some squeaking boy actor. Cleopatra is so sure of the power other femininity that she can dismiss the underlying actors body as a poor imitation other: in her own mind at least, she is the perfection of which he is the defect.

If the theater of the transvestite comedies is characterized by its playing out of a lack in which women eventually disappear, the theater of Antony and Cleopatra reinstates female presence precisely over the body of the boy actor, and precisely by calling attention to his--not her--lack. She does not have Antony--s "inches" (1.3.40), she reminds us early on, and she can only play at putting on Antony--s sword (2.5.23); but in her, the tropes of lack are rewritten as the tropes of an endlessly generative fullness that underscores the lack in others: a fullness that makes hungry where most it satisfies, that draws everything into itself and threatens to make a gap in nature (2.2.238-39, 217-19). Through this rewriting, Shakespeare makes it possible to imagine a theater allied with female generativity, with what Cleopatra calls --the memory of my womb-- (3.13.163),[4] a theater as far away as possible from the male spectacle promoted by Caesar--and from his own earlier transvestite comedies.

Recently we have been told that transvestite theater is the logical culmination of the reigning anatomical model of sexual difference in the Renaissance,[5] a
model that in effect does away with women's bodies altogether. I refer of course to the Galenic or "one-sex" model as it was delineated by Thomas Laqueur and brought powerfully into the domain of literary studies by Stephen Greenblatt.[6] In this model, male and female genitals are (by now famously) structurally homologous; the female wears hers inside, rather than outside, only because she lacks the superior heat necessary to thrust hers out. Under the aegis of this model, the female body is by definition defective insofar as it is present at all; indeed, insofar as the "one sex" is inevitably male, anatomically speaking the female body can scarcely be said to be present. But despite—or sometimes because of—this disappearing act, English Renaissance literary scholars interested in gender have rushed to embrace the Galenic model, discovering in it in effect a new orthodoxy, one of the things that we can now take for granted in the Renaissance.[7]

The appeal to any medical model is by no means an obvious or a necessary move; though one of Galen's recent adherents can claim self-assuredly that "our notions of our bodies are, after all, constructed primarily through their descriptions in the discourses of medicine and science,"[8] it's by no means clear in the twentieth century, let alone the sixteenth, that our notions of our bodies are more indebted to medicine and science than, say, to religious doctrine or to all the cultural and individual practices—and accompanying psychic fantasies—that teach us who we are in a bodily sense from birth onward. And the appeal to this particular medical model seems to me especially vexed, for two reasons. First, because the model may not in fact be entirely historically accurate, or not accurate in quite the hegemonic way that its proponents suppose.[9] And second, because elevation of the one-sex model to hegemonic status—as the single prototype that determined the way that early modern people thought about anatomical sexual differences—sometimes turns out to be only the most recent way of reinforcing lack, made respectable by its apparent claim to historical accuracy. But Shakespeare himself seems far from certain that there is only one sex; seen from within the context of contemporary medical discourses about gender difference, Shakespeare's willingness to experiment with making defect perfection in Antony and Cleopatra may signal his participation in a complex conversation about anatomical sexual difference—a conversation that we are not likely to hear if we know in advance that there is only one way to think anatomically about sexual difference in the Renaissance. We might frame our thinking about his participation in this conversation by asking: if it makes sense to see Shakespeare's foregrounding of the boy actor in the theater of his transvestite comedies as the logical end of the one-sex model, of what model(s) might those aspects of Cleopatra's theater most allied with a generative womb-space be the logical end? For what model(s) might Cleopatra speak when she recuperates the female body specifically from the inadequacies of the squeaking boy actor?
In the interests of beginning to make this conversation audible, I want to test out the hegemony of the Galenic model in a very limited arena: medical or medically inflected texts published in England in the English language from roughly mid-sixteenth century to the time of Shakespeare's death. What exactly is the status of the one-sex model in these texts? Is it in fact the only show in town? We need to begin, I think, by asking what exactly we mean by the one-sex model, what counts as evidence for it. There's no question that the medical discourses assumed certain similarities between male and female bodies: the as-yet-functionally-unacknowledged ovaries are normally called stones or testicles and are non-Aristotelianly assumed to produce their own version of seed, one weaker and less effective than male seed. There's also little question that the male body remains the gold standard, that against which the female must be defined. But neither of these assumptions by itself has much power to surprise or allure; neither constitutes what contemporary critics seem to mean by allusions to the one-sex model. The aspect of the one-sex model that seems particularly sexy in contemporary discourse is the invertibility of male and female sexual organs, the structural homology that apparently did away with anatomical sexual difference and could turn a woman into a man merely by raising her temperature. This is what excites our imagination. But how hegemonic was this aspect of the one-sex theory in vernacular medical works in sixteenth-century England? How prominent is it, for example, in the developing vernacular medical discourse and in popular works about the body?

A nod toward the Galenic model does indeed turn up in the work of Thomas Vicary, "Serjeant of the Surgeons to Henry VIII, Queen Mary, Edward VI, and Queen Elizabeth; Master of the Barber-Surgeons' Company; and Chief Surgeon to St. Bartholomew's Hospital, London, 1548-62." (all of which makes him sound well placed to have a hegemonic opinion). But unlike his twentieth-century counterparts, Vicary is distinctly unexcited by (almost uninterested in) the homology, which he in any case presents more as a loose analogy than as a principle of invertibility that does away with anatomical sex difference. He makes the transition from unisex to female anatomy by noting that ---the Testikles be without; but in woman it abydeth within, for their Testicles stande within, as it shal be declared hereafter.---[10] He then continues: "Next foloweth the Matrix in women: The Matrix in woman is an official member, compounde and Nerueous, and in complexion colde and dry. And it is the felde of mans generation; and it is an instrument susceptible, that is to say, a thing receying or taking ... : the likenes of it is as it were a yarde reuersed or turned inwarde, hauing testikles likewise, as aforesaid: also the Matrix hath two concauites or selles" (77). Vicary here echoes an earlier English vernacular medical text: in The Cyrurgie of Guy de Chauliac, an anonymous Middle English translation in manuscript of Guy de Chauliac's 1363 Inventarium seu collectorium in parte cyrurgicali medicine, women have their stones within and the matrix has the same hollowness and hole as the yard and is as large as the yard "turned again or put within.---[11] But
neither of these works embraces the full-blown doctrine of homology: like the Cynurgie, Vicary does not mention the role of heat in extruding or retaining the genitals within and never implies the convertibility of female to male. Moreover, Vicary’s phraseology "the likenes of it is as it were" suggests a self-conscious analogy, twice distanced from fact, rather than a literal description of a structural identity. Even as an analogy, that is, the homology between matrix and yard appears here in a weak form—-weaker than other terms of comparison that Vicary invokes shortly after this one: "the necke [of the matrix] . . . in her concavitie hath many involutions and pleates, ioyned together in the maner of Rose leaues before they be fully spread or ripe, and so they be shut togethcer as a Purse mouth" (77) "A whole world view makes the vagina look like a penis to Renaissance observers," Laqueur says (Making Sex, 82); but for Vicary, the vagina can look as much like a rose or a purse as like a penis. And while he clearly knows the Galenic model, he does not seem to deduce from it any "transcendental claim that there exists but one sex" (Laqueur, Making Sex, 60), any principle of covert maleness in the female: his matrix is as much like a classically female rose as like a yard.

And as far as I have been able to discover, this rather weak form of the one-sex model is its sole appearance in a sixteenth-century English vernacular medical text.[12] It does not appear, for example, in the work of a later anatomist, John Banister, "Master in Chururgerie, and Practerion in Phisicke," whose compilation The Historic of Man (London, 1578) advertises itself as "sucked from the sappe of the most approved Anathomistes, in this present age, compiled in most compendious forme, and now published in English, for the utilitie of all godly Chirurgians, within this Realme." Either his most approved anathomistes did not rely heavily on the one-sex model or he did not choose to suck that particular bit of sap from them: though he is perfectly willing to compare women to men in other respects—-they do not have the same protuberances in their throats that men have, they are more fatty than men, they have special veins which dispense milk to their paps, and so forth—-he declines to compare female genital parts to male, indeed declines to write about female genital parts at all. He describes the male genitalia at length in book 6, on "the instrumentes servyng to the propagation of mankynd," but refuses to lift "up the vayle of Natures secretes, in women—-s shapes" (fol. 89v)[13] even long enough to dismiss the female genitalia by saying that they are inverted versions of the male, as he might modestly have done. In language that everywhere suggests his anxiety about sexual difference even while he declines to write about it, he announces in his introductory "Epistle to the Chirurgians" that he has "endeavoured to set wyde open the closet doore of natures secretes, whereinto every Godly Artist may safely enter, to see clearely all the partes, and notable deuises of nature in the body of man. From the female, and that (as I suppose) for sundry good considerations, I have wholly abstained my penne: least, shunning Charibdis, I should fall into Scylla headlong" (Biv). The pen of the Godly artist can safely
penetrate the space of natures closet only insofar as that space is imagined as inside the body of a man; in a woman’s body, the closet would be transformed into an engulfing whirlpool. And apparently there is no penis hidden behind this woman’s secret fold of flesh;[14] in a metaphoric transformation that neatly reverses the premise of the Galenic model. Banister—s penetrations locate not the covert penis in women but the feminized space of Nature’s closet in men.

Despite this reversal, Banister does in fact go on in his Proeme to cite one of the familiar tropes of the one-sex model, the transformation of women into men; but here, too, the model is most conspicuous by its absence.

It is strangue to us that women have bearded, albeit not so every where: for in Caria it is a thyng familiar: whereas some of them beying a while fruiefull, but after widowes, and for that suppressed of naturall course, put on virilitie, being then bearded, hearie, and chaunged in voyce. Shall it be counted a fable that toucheth the transformation of one kinde into an other, as the Male into the Female and so contrariwise? Surely Plinie saith. No: since him selfe to have sene a woman chaunged into man, in the day Of mariaje, he playniy avoucheth. (Biiv)

Here, if anywhere, we would expect an allusion to the one-sex model that might explain such transformations; but we would be disappointed. For despite its association with the one-sex model in Par—, Montaigne, Crooke, and elsewhere, the transformation of woman to man here seems to represent less the slipperiness of gender categories in the one-sex model than the slipperiness of species, the "transformation of one kinde into an other": far from being one flesh, woman and man seem here, temporarily at least, to belong to distinct species. And in fact Banister—s use of the trope of transformation emphatically dissociates that trope from the discourse of Galenic homologies: it occurs not in the section describing the genitals but in the section cataloguing the amazing diversity of animals and people in remote times and places; whatever its use elsewhere, here it serves as part of Banisters effort to save the authority of the ancients by arguing that what seems impossibly strange in their accounts—and therefore evidence of their errors—may be merely the strangeness of what is temporally or geographically removed from us. The transformations of gender that are local and contemporary in Montaigne or Par— are significant here specifically as the sign of the far away and long ago; they testify to the strangeness of the remote, not to a currently ruling notion of sexual homology.

Banister, in short, does not have recourse to the structural homologies of the one-sex model even when we might expect him to allude to them for convenience or convention’s sake; although of course we have no way of knowing how strenuous an act of suppression this might have entailed on his part, he writes as though this aspect of the theory simply doesn’t exist for him or for his audience. In fact, on the one occasion on which he allows himself to
describe both male and female genitals, he assumes not their likeness but their difference; if we are one flesh, he suggests, we are one flesh not in our genitals but in our brains, which turn out to house the replicas of our two distinct sexual parts:

Behynd this vaulted part in the extreme part of the brayne towards Cerebellum, and in the upper part of the thyrd ventricle. Nature hath feyned certaine eminent partes, whiche in their upper partes, represent the likenes or Image of Testicles, and so called therfore of Anathomistes Tester, neare unto the which, two other particles yet somewhat greater are to be discerned, called according to their figure clunes, the haunches or buttockes. Betwene which lyeth that hole, whiche is already noted to from the thyrd, to the fourth ventricle, and seemeth like unto the fundament. Furthermore in the forepart of these Testicles (as we call them) stretchyng to the thyrd ventricle, an other part of the brayne appearech, which not unaptly, but very elegantly expresseth the shape or privye part of a woman. With this body is sene a little hard Glandule, in colour contrary to the substaunce of the brayne, that is to say, somewhat yellow, covered with the thinne Membran.

This Glandule is called Pinalis, or Conarium, fitly representyng the shape of the yard. So that in the brayne wanteth nether the figure of the Testicles, buttockes, fundament, womans shape, nor yard. (fol. 101v)

Whatever his worries about falling into Scylla by writing about the female genitals, Banister is not at all shy about sex on--or in--the brain: he writes as though we carry around in our heads not only the idea of two distinct sexes but their physical embodiment as well. Apparently ignorant of--or unimpressed by--the correspondence of matrix to yard, Banister is clearly delighted by the elegance, fitness, and aptness with which our brains--whatever sex we are--contain all sexual possibilities. If we are one sex, this astonishing anatomical fantasy seems to suggest, we are one in that the very flesh of our brains elegantly expresses our bifold sexual difference.

Banister's bizarre anatomy matters, I think, not because it reflects widespread opinion (my guess is that few followed Banister in his delight at a brain that was missing nothing, that elegantly expressed both male and female parts) but because it suggests that Galen's one-sex model had not driven out other ways of thinking medically about sexual difference in sixteenth-century England. If humoral theory might, for example, explain the failure of a woman to extrude a set of genitals in every way homologous with man's and so might be understood as the basis for the Galenic model, it might equally well be understood as the basis for a theory of sexual difference.[15] In the hodgepodge of questions published under the name of The Problemes of Aristotle ("with other Philosophers and Phisicians, wherein are contained divers questions, with their answers, touching the estate of mans bodie" [London, 1597]) sexual difference is
everywhere assumed and is explained through humoral theory, which accounts, for example, for why women grow more hair than men, why man's seed is white and woman's red, why women's pulses are slower and their voices shriller than men's, why women aren't ambidextrous, why men don't have paps as large as women's. Despite frequent reference to Galen and a near-obsessive interest in comparison of the sexes, the homologies of his one-sex model are entirely absent from this humoral account of the estate of man's body:[16] in this popular compendium,[17] female difference and the dangers attaching to that difference are far more visible than any potentially reassuring sense that the woman is merely a weak and defective man.

Problemes is of course securely grounded in the sense of woman's defectiveness, teleologically and biologically: the female is "a monster in nature" (E8r), sick even when she is well ("A slow and weake pulse doth betoken the coldnes of the hart and an evil complexion. And therefore a woman which is in health hath a slower and weaker pulse then a man" [D4r]). But the satisfactions of proclaiming women inferior turn out to be short-lived, for this monster problematically tends to contaminate its biological and teleological superior at the point of origin. In its construction of difference, Problemes returns again and again to the "corrupt undigested blood" of menstruation (E3r), and it rehearses all the old tropes about the pernicious effects of this "infectious matter" (E4r). Familiarly, the eyes of a menstruating woman stain glass (B2r), and her menstrual blood kills trees and makes dogs run mad (E4r-E4v); even her hair—which grows more abundantly than man---s hair, because she is moister—is dangerous at certain times of the month: --Albertus doth saie, that if the haire of a woman in the time of hir flowers be put into dung, a venemous serpent is engendred of it" (A4r). Even the graying of red hair turns out to be attributable to menstrual blood: red hair turns white sooner than other hair, we are told, "bicause that rednes is an infirmitie of the hayre, for it is engendred of a weake and infirme matter, that is to say, of a matter corrupted with the flowers of a woman" (A6r). But red hair is by no means alone in its contaminating origin: if nature expels menstrual blood "euery moneth, as being an enimie unto life" (E4r-E4v), man himself turns out to be substantially made from this enemy. The author refutes the idea that "the seede of the father and the mother doth goe into the substance of the childe in the wombe" by assigning the superior position of pure efficient cause ("according to Aristotle, and other Philosophers") to the male seed (E3v), but this of course leaves the woman's seed in the position of pure material cause. And that female seed is a distillation of her menstrual blood, red rather than white "bicause the flowers are corrupt undigested blood, and therefore it hath the colour of blood" (E3r). By this logic, Problemes concludes, "onely the flowers of the woman are the materiall cause of the yoong one" (E4r).[18]

Insofar as sexual difference collapses in Problemes, it collapses not along the teleological axis of the Galenic model, in which a defective woman may become
a perfected man, but along a genetic axis, in which the male is always potentially susceptible to his female origin because he is made of her infectious matter. So susceptible that some males don't make it past that pernicious origin as male at all:

Question. How are Hermaphrodites begotten?

Answer. . . . because nature doth always tend unto that which is best, therefore she doth always intend to beget the male, and not the female, because that the female is onely for the males sake, and a monster in nature. Therefore the male is sometime begotten in all principal parts, and yet through the euill disposition of the wombe, and object, and inequality of the seede, when nature cannot perfect and ende the male, she doth bring forth the female, or Hermaphrodite. (E8r)

Whatever the ontological superiority of the male, its female origins—not only the womb but the over-powerful female seed and a nature imagined as feminized—can convert it to their own substance: what begins as teleologically male ends as substantially female. In its struggle to affirm gender difference by affirming an essential maleness against an accidentally caused femaleness (or the hermaphroditism that seems roughly equivalent), this passage ends by recording the collapse of difference, but not in a Galenic direction: not through finding a defective penis in woman but through finding an accidental womb in what should have been a man.

The Problemes of Aristotle is far from systematic or intellectually coherent in its representations of sexual difference. For the most part, it assumes physiological sexual difference, but a difference in which maleness is always liable to be contaminated by femaleness; when such contamination reaches its maximum point, sexual difference itself disappears into the hermaphrodite, or the female who is teleologically male. Insofar as it approaches a one-sex model, it does so from a direction opposite to that of the Galenists; and it nowhere suggests the genital homology that is the hallmark of the contemporary Galenist. But Problemes—like the other works I've been examining—is primarily concerned with "the estate of mans bodie" and only secondarily with the issue of anatomical sexual difference. What of works devoted specifically to women's bodies? Thomas Raynold's The Byrth of Mankynde, otherwise named the Womans Booke was the only gynecological work available in English before 1612.[19] Raynold's work was immensely popular—if we judge by editions in English, more popular than any of the other works I have discussed; after the first edition in 1545, it was reprinted in 1552, 1560, 1565, 1585, 1588, 1598, 1604, 1613, 1626, and 1634.[20] And despite its foregrounding of anatomy[21] and its frequent comparison of elements of the male and female body—veins, bladder, seed, and so forth—The Byrth of Mankynde never invokes the Galenic model.
As with the other works that I've cited, this absence is most striking when the occurrence of the tropes surrounding the one-sex model makes us anticipate its appearance. In introducing the figures illustrating female anatomy, for example, Raynold tells us that the first figure is that of a man's body. We might expect an argument for sexual homology to occur here; indeed, Laqueur's one reference to The Byrth of Mankynde—the caption to illustrations of the male body combined and used in it (Making Sex, 111)—could be read to suggest that the male body could serve indifferently for the female because they were homological, hence indistinguishable. But in fact Raynold is very careful to distinguish anatomically between male and female bodies precisely on the grounds of anatomical sexual difference. His commentary identifies G and H on his first figure as the right and left seed vessels, and then goes on to add "but this G and H hath no place in the women."[22] At the end of his description of the second figure, as though suddenly embarrassed by his use of a male figure, he says, "Here ye shalbe adverstysed that although these ii. fyrst fyrst figures be made principally for the man, yet may they serve as well to expresse the woman" Here, if anywhere, we might expect the argument from homology, but he goes on to make exactly the opposite case: "for the man and woman diiffer in nothyng but in the priuie parts" (sig. Hhhr). And by the 1560 edition, the troublesome body of a man has been replaced by the body of a woman (fol. 43v)—as though even the 1545 explanation would no longer suffice for a population interested in sexual dimorphism and the differences between bodies.[23]

When Raynold writes about the congruence between male and female sexual parts, he characteristically does so not in the service of an argument about homology but in the service of an argument about function. The comparable size of penis and womb passage would, in Galenic terms, be taken as evidence for the one-sex model: if the neck of the womb is the penis inside out, then the two should be roughly the same length. But Raynold reads this similarity not as evidence of homology but as evidence of Nature's wise management of differentiated generative function: "To make especyall mencion of the length of this womb passage were but folly, for the diuersitees therof. Notwithstanding in wemen it is estemed of the length of x, xi, xii, or xiii fingers bredth, sum more sum lesse: And this we may say that nature hath so prouided that it is of sufficient length to receaue the priuy part of man in the tyme of generation dyrectyng the same towards the womb porte" (fol. 10r). Anatomy here demonstrates nothing about homology or about female inferiority, ontological or biological; instead, it demonstrates the fitness with which the differentiated genital parts are created.

This is in fact Raynold's emphasis throughout the Byrth, an emphasis that undercuts the teleological logic of homology and is in fact specifically designed to combat the misogyny that usually accompanies that logic. Here, for example, is Raynold on the subject of women's seed: it is "not so stronge, ferme and myghcy in operation as the seed of man . . . howbeit as conuenient and propre for the
pourpose for the whiche it was ordeynid, as the seede of man for his pourpose"
(fol. 15r). The simultaneous similarity and difference of the seed—men and
women share the same substance, but the man's is stronger—that might
elsewhere be read as evidence both for female inferiority and for homology here
serve Raynold's argument about the perfection of differentiated function, an
argument that he makes with a self-conscious glance over his shoulder at his
misogynous predecessors:

This foresaid seede, as we saide before, is nothyng so firme, perfect, absolut,
and myghry in woman as in man: and yet can you not cal this any imperfection or
lacke in woman: for the woman in her kynd, and for thoffice and pourpose
wherfor she was made is even as absolute and perfect as man in his kynd:
nether is woman to be calld (as sum do) unperfecter then man (for bycause the
man is moore myghtyer and strong: the woman wekar, more feble) for by this
reason the horse, the lyon, the olyphant, camel, and many other beestes shold
be calld more perfect than man: to the which man is not able to compare in
naturall myght and strength. (fol. 24r)

Women are not imperfect men, he argues; they are perfect in their own kind.[24]
The argument from kind in fact suggests that, far from being an inferior version of
man, woman may be an entirely separate species: "imperfection is when that any
particular creature doth lacke any properte, instrument, or qualite, which
communely, by nature is in all other or the moore pare of that kynde: comparing it
to other of the same kinde, and not of an other kynde" (fol. 24v).

It's worth noting that Raynold rescues women from infamy only at the cost of
excoriating men in whom he finds "woman lyke" qualities, as though he can value
what is womanly only by separating it rigorously from what is manly. His instance
of imperfection within kind is the effeminate man: "But truely comparing one man
to another, such as be geldyd and want the genitories be moch febler, weeke and
effeminat then other: in voyce woman lycke, in gesture and condition nise, in
softnesse ofskyn, and plumpnesse of the body fatter and rounder: in strength
and force impotent nothing manly ne bold: the which imbecyllite in them may well be
named imperfection" (fol. 24r-24v). Admiring women is clearly not without its
attendant anxieties. Nonetheless, in the context of works on reproductive
difference, Raynold's is refreshing in the boldness with which it refutes the
notion of female imperfection.

Even menstrual blood, that ancient token of women's defect, becomes for him
evidence of nature's wisdom:

The cause and reason why Nature created this perpetuall course of termes in
women is this: for so much as almyghty god had to institute that women shoulde
be the vessels, wherein the seede of mankinde wold be conceaued, efformed or
fashioned, augmented, nourished and brought to perfection: This could not be
doone unless there were a commodious and convenient place, to this office
assigned and destinat wherefore nature created the womb or matrix to be the
sayd receptacle, and house of office wherein she mought at her leaser wurke her
divine feates about the seede once conceaued. Agayne it is not ynough the sede
to be placed, unless also it have foode and nourishment, to thencress and
augmentation of the same: Wherefore prudent lady nature ful wysely hath
provided that there shulde always be prest and ready, a continual course and
resort of blud in the vaynes of the matrice as a very naturall source, sprynge,
fountayne, or wel evermore redy to arrouse, water, and nourishe the feature so
sone as it shal be conceaued. -- Which food although it is ordayned for this
necessary purpose, yet when the purpose fayleth -- it shold be to the place but
a burden, and unprofitable lode, there to remayne or linger, (fol. 34v-35v)

Spring, fountain, or well: Raynold--s images of natural fecundity and purity are
an antidote to all the old associations of menstrual blood with poison and
infection. Even the commonplace that menstruation is the purgation of excesses
and impurities in the blood occasions his scorn:

But here ye shall note that they be greatly disceaued and abused, which call the
termes, the woman--s purgation, or the closynge of there blud: as who should
say, that it were the refuse, drosse, and vilar part of the outher blud remaynyng
in the body, naturally every monyth sequestrat, and separated from the purer for
the vylite and euell qualite therein comprehyndyd: for undouiedly the blud is euyn
as pure and holsum as all the rest of the blud in eny partie of the boody els.

Is it to be thought that nature wold feade the tender and dilicate infant in the
mothers womb, with the refuse of the blud, or not rather with the purist of it. (fol.
44r-44v; sig. I.vir-I.viv)

The peroration to his discussion of menstruation triumphantly dismisses his
predecessors (predecessors whose line of argument is still current at the end of
the century, for example, in The Problemes of Aristotle):"Yet much more are to
be detestid and abhorred the shamefull iyes and slaunders that Plynie, Albertus
Magnus De Secretes Mulierum, and dyvers othermo, have wrytten, of the
venomous and daungerous infectyue nature of the womans flowers or termes:
The which al be but dreames and playne dotage: to reherse there fon wurdes
here were but losse ofynke and paper: wherfore let them passe with their
auctours" (fol. 45r; sig. l.viir).

When Raynold looks at the uterus, he does not see a defective or inverted penis;
he sees an organ perfect in its own kind, wisely prepared by a beneficent lady
nature whose feminized virtues are reflected in the specifically female place she
provides for the generation of mankind. Defending his decision to publish his
work in English against those who claim that men who read about woman's private parts might "conceave a certayn lothsomnes and abhorringe towards a woman," he declares, "I know nothing in woman so pryve, ne so secret that thei shold nede to care who knew of it: neyther is there any part in woman moore to be abhorred, then in man"; rather charmingly, he adds that by his opponents' logic, physicians and surgeons should abhor their wives, "And I mysef lyke wise, which wryth this booke, shold merueylously aboue many other abhore or lothe wemen: but to be short, there is no such thyng, neyther any cause therto why" (Prologue, sigs. C.vir C.viv).[25] Even when he seems to accept man's oncological superiority as efficient cause of generation, he relocates that claim in a context that gives priority to women: "And all though that man, be as princypall moovar and cause of the generation, yet (no displeasur to men) the woman dothe confer and contribute much more, what to the encresement of the chyld in her wombe, and what to the nourysshment therof after the byrth, then doth the man. And doutlesse if a man wold demaund to whome the chyide oweth moost his generation: ye may murthely make answere that, to the mother: whether ye regarde the paynes in bearyng, other elles the conference of most matter in begetting" (fol. 1v).[26] Full of affectionate regard for lady nature—s wisdom in making women, attentive to the lived experience of childbearing and child-nurturing as opposed to the ontology that always locates woman as secondary, Raynold sees in the uterus not a defective penis but a replica of the human heart: the bottom of the matrix "is not parfactly round bowlwyse," he tells us, "but rather lyke the forme of a mans harte" (fol. 11v).

Byrth remained the only gynecological handbook in English until well into the seventeenth century; its first competitor, the 1612 translation of Guillemeau's Child-birth, or the Happy Deliverie, displayed no interest in anatomy or in the one-sex model.[27] But something had obviously changed at the beginning of the seventeenth century:[28] whereas the texts in English in the sixteenth century seem for the most part ignorant of or uninterested in the one-sex model, Helkiah Crooke in Microcosmographia. A Description of the Body of Man (1615) specifically mentions it—apparently in order to argue against it. This puts him in the curious position of being simultaneously the model's best—indeed, virtually its first—full expositor in English, and its severest critic.[29]

Like Raynold, Crooke is especially concerned to refute the idea that a woman is by definition an imperfect or defective man ("For the female sexe as well as the male is a perfection of mankinde. ... The truth is, that as the soule of a woman is the same divine nature with a mans, so is her body a necessary being, a first and not a second intention of Nature, her proper and absolute worke not her error or prevarication" [2,58]); like Raynold, he understands the womb not as a defect but as a "most noble and almost divine Nurse" (262).[30] But unlike Raynolds, Crooke's refutation turns explicitly on his relation to the one-sex model.
At first, in book 4 ("Of the Naturall Parts belonging to Generation, as well in Men as in Women"), Crooke seems to be a proponent of the one-sex model: Nature made, he tells us, "another sexe of mankinde, not altogether of so hot a temper or constitution, because she should have a superfluity of bloode for the nourishment of the infant; as also chat the partes of generation for want of heate to thrust them forth remaining within, might make a fit place wherein to conceive, breede, and perfect the same" (199). But Crooke transforms the emphasis of the model even as he enunciates it, seeing in it the signs not of imperfection but of perfection. The coldness that keeps woman's (apparently homologous) genitals inside her is no longer evidence other weakness or of the failure of nature's plan (to produce men); it is now a necessity, providing both the superfluity of blood necessary for food and the interior "fit place" for generation.[31] Each time Crooke returns to the Galenic model in book 4, he amplifies this theme: men and women have the same sexual parts, he tells us, but women's "for want of heate [are] reteined within. -- Although heerin Nature hath excellently acquitted her selfe, that the abatement of naturall heate, which in man is the onely naturall and necessary cause of their dissolution, should so admirably become in women the original of generation, whereby we should attaine a kinde of eternity even of our bodies" (216). Even when he flirts with the idea of women as imperfect men, he ultimately insists on their perfection: "A woman is so much lesse perfect then a man by how much her heate is lesse and weaker then his; yet as I saide is this imperfection turned unto perfection, because without the woman, mankinde could not have been perfected by the perfecter sexe," he says (216-17), leaving both the perfecting agent and the "perfecter sexe" startlingly ambiguous.

Moreover, Crooke's embrace of the one-sex model--even in the new improved version in which imperfection becomes perfection--is far from secure. Abundant heat thrusts men's testicles "foorth of the body," he tells us, "whereas in women they remaine within, because their dull and sluggish heate is not sufficient to thrust them out. The trueth of this appeareth by manifold stories of such women, whose more active and operative heate hath thrust out their Testicles, and of women made them men: as we shall relate hereafter more at large in our Controversies" (204). But the truth turns out not to be so readily discerned. Crooke is above all interested in the controversies to which he refers his reader here:[32] and by the time he arrives at the controversy to which he has referred us (the eighth controversy of book 4, "How the parts of generation in men and women doe differ"), he strenuously refutes both these manifold stories and the Galenic logic on which they are based:

But what shall we say to those so many stories of women changed into men? -- If such a thing shal happen, it may well be answered that such parties were Hermophradites, that is, had the parts of both sexes, which because of the weaknesse of their heat in their nonage lay hid, but brake out afterward as their
heate grew unto strength. Or we may safely say, that there are some women so hot by nature that their clitoris hangeth foorth in the fashion of a man's member, which because it may be distended and againe grow loose and flaccid, may deceive ignorant people. Againe Midwives may oft be deceived because of the faultie conformation of those parts, for sometimes the member and testicles are so small, and sinke so deepe into the body that they cannot easily be discerned. (250)

In his view, someone with a man's parts inside is a defective man or a hermaphrodite, not a woman. And while heat here—as in the Galenic model—is the operative force that brings the genitals out, a "woman" does not become a "man" simply because her genitals have been extruded; in fact, the apparent resemblance of clitoris to penis in this case is fit only "to deceive ignorant people."[33] As the stories become suspect, so does the truth to which they had apparently testified: Crooke repeats Galen—s version of the one-sex model once again in this controversy only to dispute it on the basis of both the number and the structure of the sexual parts, triumphantly concluding, "Me thinks it is very absurd to say, that the necke of the wombe inverted is like the member of a man. . . . Howsoever therefore the necke of the wombe shall be inverted, yet will it never make the virile member" (250).

Once he takes this position, Crooke never wavers from it. In book 5 (—Wherein the Historie of the Infant is acurately describ—ed") he refutes the model again at length, taking up the attack explicitly under the banner of female perfection in the first of the controversies, "Of the Difference of the Sexes":

The Peripatetiks thinke that Nature ever intendeth the generation of a Male, and that the Female is procreated by accident out of a weaker seede which is not able to attaine the perfection of the male. Wherefore Aristotle thinketh that the Woman or female is nothing else but an error or aberration of Nature ... ; yea he preceedeth further and saith, that the female is a bye worke or prevarication, yea the first monster in Nature. [The marginal note to this paragraph reads: "Aristot. Error."]

Galen .. ., following Aristotle something too neere, writeth, that the formative power which is in the seede of man being but one, doth alwayes entend the generation of one, that is, the Male; but if she erre from hir scope and cannot generate a male, then bringeth she foorth the female which is the first and most simple imperfection of a male, which therefore he calleth a creature lame, occasionall and accessary, as if she were not of the mayne, but made by the bye, [Margin: "Galens Error."]

Now heerin he putteth the difference betwixt her and the Male, that in males the parts of generation are without the body, in Females they lye within because of
the weaknesse of the heate, which is not able to thrust them foorth. And therefore he saith, that the necke of the wombe is nothing else but the virile member turned inward, and the bottome of the wombe nothing but the scrotum or cod inverted.

But this opinion of Galen and Aristotle we cannot approve. For we thinke that Nature as well intendeth the generation of a female as of a male: and therefore it is unworthily said that she is an Error or Monster in Nature. For the perfection of all naturall things is to be esteemed and measured by the end: now it was necessary that woman should be so formed or else Nature must have missed other scope, because shee intended a perfect generation, which without a woman cannot be accomplished. [Margin: "Disprooved."]

These things which Galen urgeth concerning the similitude, or parts of generation differing onely in scite and position, many men do esteeme very absurd. Sure we are that they favour little of the truth of Anatomy, as we have already prooved in the Booke going before: wherein we have shewed how little likenesse there is betwixt the necke of the womb and the yard, the bottome of it and the cod. Neither is the structure, figure, or magnitude of the testicles one and the same, nor the distribution and insertion of the spermatick vessels alike,[34] wherefore we must not thinke that the female is an imperfect male differing only in the position of the genitals. [Margin: --no similitude betwixt their Genitals.--] (271)

Ultimately, for Crooke, the Galenic model of homology is incompatible with the idea of woman's perfection; his final "wherefore we must not thinke" rests his case for woman as perfect in herself--not as the "imperfection of the male"--on his refutation of the homological model.

Crooke's insistence that he is in good company--"many men do esteeme [Galen's position] very absurd"--suggests that he was not alone in his views, and his advertised position as King James's physician seems to give those views a certain amount of authority; the second edition of Microcosmographia (1618) announces itself as "published by the kings Maiesties especiall Direction and Warrant, according to the first integrity, as it was Originally written by the Author."[35] If it is the case that the one-sex model had become current enough in England by 1615 to require refutation by a very well-placed medical authority, it also seems to be the case that the model enters vernacular English medical discourse largely via this distinctly hegemonic refutation of it.

The transvestite theater of Shakespeare's comedies may perhaps be the logical culmination of the one-sex model, but it seems not to be the chronological culmination of it: at least in vernacular medical writing in England in the sixteenth century, there is little evidence of the model--s hold on the imagination.[36] In fact, if we can imagine a heyday of the model in early modern England, a moment at which the model became important enough to require an extensive
commentary (and refutation) in English, Crooke's work suggests that such a moment would coincide not with the period of Shakespeare's transvestite comedies but with the period of the tragedies, in which the inward space of male subjectivity—the space Greenblatt associates with the later development of the novel[37] is problematically formed out of the matrix of the female.[38] This misalliance might teach us caution both in the assumption that there is one reigning model of sexual difference at any given time and in the application of historical to literary texts, particularly if the historical texts are used to disable certain kinds of discourse on the grounds of their ahistoricity.

Given the relative lack of evidence for the presence of the Galenic model in sixteenth-century England, why has the idea been taken up as a new orthodoxy among critics of early modern English literature? Contemporary users of the one-sex model tend to find it liberating insofar as it appears to break down the stability of gender categories. But at least in Shakespearean tragedy, there is nothing liberating about the breakdown of gender categories: men like Hamlet or Lear famously dread the woman's part in themselves, and women who possess the rod are a source of horror. Moreover, the model apparently does away with the anatomical basis for gender—and hence for gender fixity—only at the cost of doing away with women's bodies: there is only one sex, and that sex is male. Laqueur himself notes the defensive functions which the Galenic model might have served for its original proponents and their early modern kin: "An almost defensive quality suggests that the politics of gender off the page might well have engendered the textual insistence that there really were no women after all" (Making Sex, 98); he speculates that the model "was framed in antiquity to valorize the extraordinary cultural assertion of patriarchy, of the father, in the face of the more sensorily evident claim of the mother" (Making Sex, 20). Is it fair to suggest that engagement with the model may occasionally serve a comparable function for some of its contemporary proponents as well? Certain aspects of the recent history of criticism suggestively ally themselves with the shift Laqueur notes. Despite Crooke---s association of the one-sex model with misogyny, that model certainly can be put to feminist uses; but it can also be used—particularly in conjunction with an insistence on the maleness of the boy actor—to argue, for example, that Shakespeare is not representing women at all. But if Shakespeare is not representing women, then certain traditional feminist concerns become irrelevant; and under the guise of engagement with a historical model that does away with sexual difference, perhaps we can imagine not only an all-male theater but also a time and place where women—and the threat their difference represents to men—simply disappear.

If recourse to the Galenic model can serve to minimize this threat, it can also serve to acknowledge it—but only (I shall argue) by consigning it to the dustbin of history. "The implication of this developmental account," Greenblatt says, "is that men grow out of or pass through women" (Shakespearean Negotiations, 81).
Though Greenblatt himself never imagines Galenic man regressively pulled back to this point of origin, others have taken his implication in that direction, explaining the "conviction that men can turn into—or be turned into—women; or perhaps more exactly, can be turned back into women" and the fear of that "disastrous slide back into the female" as a consequence of the Galenic model.[39]

But even if we knew that this model was a force in the imaginations of Shakespeare and his contemporaries, could it support this reading of it? The model does suggest that all of us wear our genitals inside until they are sorted into male and female, for most of us in utero. But--because of its emphasis on teleology rather than origin--it reads that similarity in terms of the female's failed maleness, not in terms of the male--s originary femaleness: in Galen's famous moles-eye simile, "the female genitalia 'do not open' and remain an imperfect version of what they would be were they thrust out-- (Laqueur, Making Sex, 28). Moreover, though Nature often produces a woman where she intended a man through a kind of teleological goof-up in utero, and a woman ex utero may occasionally climb the teleological ladder and become a man if she attains to his superior heat and thrusts her genitals outward, Nature never reverses herself and produces a woman out of an already finished man. As Crooke reports, "the ancients have thought that a woman might become a man, but not on the contrary side a man become a woman" (Microcosmographia, 249)[40] But the unidirectionality of the model does not prevent critics--even critics who are fully aware of its theoretical and medical impossibility--from deriving fantasies of reversion to femaleness from the model; Orgel, for example, writes as though not only the fantasies of reversion but social customs as pervasive as breeching are based in it: "In the medical literature we all start as women, and the culture confirmed this by dressing all children in skirts."[41]

Given that one has to swim against the tide of the unidirectionality of the model itself, why locate the fear of reversion to femaleness within that model? I can answer that question only from within the confines of my own methodological assumptions--assumptions that will certainly not be granted by everyone;[42] but seen from within those confines, the move to locate the regressive pull of the female in the one-sex model looks strikingly consistent with the defensive purposes Laqueur outlines, in its consequences if not its intentions. Greenblatt--s language—that "men grow out of or pass through women"--suggests a far more homely origin for fears of reversion to femaleness than the Galenic model: it suggests the presence of the maternal body largely occluded by Galenist theory and by its contemporary proponents.[43] As many feminist critics--often not cited by the contemporary Galenists--have argued, the regressive pull of the female is a psychological derivative of both the biological facts of human reproduction and the social customs that left the young boy initially almost entirely in the domain of his mother or her female substitutes and defined him as
quasi-female until maleness was conferred on him by separation from women.[44] But it is easier and certainly more reassuring to ascribe the pull back toward femininity to a questionable interpretation of a detail in an outmoded medical model that we can locate safely in the "out there" of history (though it may not in fact have been historically present) than to causes that remain disturbingly familiar to us. Under the aegis of the Galenic model, we can write as though that pull were only a historical curiosity: it can--t happen here.

Where then does this leave us in our thinking about Shakespeare and the Galenic model? First of all, I think we need to be more cautious in appealing to the unique explanatory force of this model for Shakespeare or for his theater. I think we need to recognize that--whether or not Shakespeare was ever aware of the medical debates[45]--his work may be in dialogue with several different medical models of sexual difference. If we may sometimes catch glimpses of the Galenic one-sex model in his plays, we may also catch glimpses of, for example, the quite different model for the collapse of sexual differentiation implicit in The Problemes of Aristotle. More broadly speaking, it seems to me possible to see in Shakespeare the beginnings of a shift from definition by telos to definition by origin, a shift of the kind implicit in Raynold when he writes that the child owes more to the mother than the father: think of Richard defining himself in relation to his mother's womb (3 Henry VI, 3.2.153-64), Lear anxiously feeling the presence of the "mother" rising within him (2.4.54), Leontes regretting that he could not remove all his wife's blood from his son as effectively as he can remove the child physically from her (2.1.56-58). And as for Cleopatra? If the logical end of the Galenic model is the transvestite theater of the comedies, perhaps Cleopatra's claim for a female theatrical space--and one written over the conventions of the transvestite theater--is the logical (if not chronological) end of Crooke's vigorous reinstatement of the female body over against the claims of the one-sex model. Perhaps Shakespeare--like Raynold before him and Crooke after him--is engaged in Antony and Cleopatra in his own version of making defect perfection.

Return to Antony and Cleopatra


[2] This disappearance is, of course, not absolute; but insofar as we "see" the male surface and are encouraged to look "beneath" it to the male body of the actor, the bodily femaleness of a Rosalind or a Viola disappears into a purely imaginary space--a disappearance aided by the absence of mature sexual women from these plays.

[3] For the counterargument, specifically the claim that reference to the boy actor
disrupts the illusion of femininity in Antony and Cleopatra, see, for example, Madelon Sprengnether, "The Boy Actor and Femininity in Antony and Cleopatra," in Shakespeare's Personality, ed. Norman N. Holland et. al. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 191, 202. Peter Stallybrass similarly assumes that Cleopatra's reference to the boy actor unfixes her femininity: in a provocative reading of moments at which boy actors were called upon to bare their breasts as fetishized objects prosthetically establishing gender, he notes that Cleopatra's baring other breast occurs in close proximity to this defeminizing reference ("Transvestism and the 'Body Beneath': Speculating on the Boy Actor," in Erotic Politics: Desire on the Renaissance Stage, ed. Susan Zimmerman [New York: Routledge, 1992], 71).

[4] I am here repeating an argument that I have made at greater length and in different terms in Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare, --Hamlet-- to --The Tempest-- (New York: Routledge, 1992), 192; see 343-44, n. 64 for other who gender Cleopatra's theater female and stress Shakespeare's alliance with her in it. For many critics, that alliance is based not in Cleopatra's generativity but in the inherent femaleness or effeminizing power of the theatrical; see Jyotsna Singh--s account of the association between the female and the theatrical in the antitheatrical and antifeminist texts and Shakespeare's reworking of this association in Antony and Cleopatra ("Renaissance Antitheatricality, Antifeminism, and Shakespeare--s Antony and Cleopatra," Renaissance Drama, n.s. 20 [1989]: 99-121), and Laura Levine--s extensive account of the idea of the self--especially the masculine self--that underlies this association in the antitheatrical tracts and in Antony and Cleopatra (Men in Women's Clothing: Anti-Theatricality and Effeminization, 1579-1642 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 1-25, 44-72)


[6] See Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, 78-93. Laqueur--s initial enunciation of the one-sex model (in "Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of Reproductive Biology," Representations 14 [Spring 1986]: 141) was greatly expanded in his Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud
Though I think that Laqueur overstates the uniform hegemony of the one-sex model and hence overlooks not only geographic differences but also the extent to which elements of a two-sex model were at home in Renaissance medical discourse, his assessment of the stakes of a stridently two-sex model that poses woman as inalterably other seems to me very compelling.

A random sampling of those who have assumed the hegemony of the one-sex model reads like a Who's Who of prominent and up-and-coming Renaissance literary critics. That the model often is tangential to the argument at hand but is cited anyway suggests its status; it is something that people in the know need to show that they know. See Peter Stallybrass, "Reading the Body: The Revenger's Tragedy and the Jacobean Theater of Consumption," Renaissance Drama 18 (1987): 145; Margreta de Grazia, "The Motive for Inferiority: Shakespeare's Sonnets and Hamlet," Style: Texts and Pretexts in the English Renaissance 23 (Fall 1989): 440; Stephen Orgel, "Nobody's Perfect," South Atlantic Quarterly 88 (Winter 1989): 13; Alan Sinfield, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading (Berkeley and Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1992), 134; Elizabeth D. Harvey, Ventriloquized Voices: Feminist Theory and English Renaissance Texts (London: Routledge, 1992), 4, 33, 87-88; Jonathan Crewe, "In the Field of Dreams: Transvestitism in Twelfth Night and The Crying Game," Representations 50 (Spring 1997): 120. In more recent work, both Orgel and Stallybrass have softened their Galenist stances, noting that the Galenic model exists in tension with other medical models (Stephen Orgel, Impersonations: The Performance of Gender in Shakespeare's England [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 19-24; Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass, "Fetishizing Gender: Constructing the Hermaphrodite in Renaissance Europe," in Body Guards, ed. Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub [London: Routledge, 1991] 81, 106, n. 2); in addition, Jones and Stallybrass warn specifically against privileging biological discourse (88). But even in muted form, the Galenic model remains integral to these works. Others have disavowed the claim to Galenic hegemony more strenuously, both insofar as it understimates other nonmedical discourses that produce gender difference or structure the body as fundamentally female (see, for example, Jean E. Howard, "Crossdressing, the Theatre, and Gender Struggle in Early Modern England," Shakespeare Quarterly 39 [Winter 1988]: 411-23, and Levine, Men in Women's Clothing, 109, 169, n. 3) and insofar as it represents medical discourse as far more monolithic than it in fact is (see, for example, Heather Dubrow on the multivocality of the gynecological tracts ["Navel Battles: Interpreting Renaissance Gynecological Manuals," American Nates and Queries 5, n.s. (1992): 67-71, and "Friction and Faction: New Directions for New Historicism," Monatshefte 4 (Summer 1992): 213-14]; see also Gail Kern Paster on humoral gender difference [The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 17, 79, 82-83] and
especially on the pervasiveness of physiological gender difference articulated through a theory of heat ["The Unbearable Coldness of Women: Women's Imperfection in the Humoral Economy," forthcoming in English Literary Renaissance 28 [Dec. 1998].) The fullest critiques are those of Katharine Park and Robert A. Nye, who argue—occasionally intemperately—against the privileging of biology over metaphysics and against the false homogeneity of the model, insisting especially on the tensions between Aristotle and Galen ("Destiny Is Anatomy," New Republic, 18 Feb. 1991: 53-57), and Patricia Parker, who demonstrates the extent to which the Galenic model of unidirectional change from (imperfect) female to (perfect) male was undercut in sixteenth-century France by other discourses that insisted on male impotence and the reverse change ("Gender Ideology, Gender Change: The Case of Marie Germain," Critical Inquiry 19 [Winter 1993]: 337-64). As far as I know, no one has examined the extent to which the model—whether or not it was overvalued or complicated by other discourses, medical and otherwise—was in fact present in English vernacular medical writing.


[9] While both Laqueur and Greenblatt pose the hegemony of the Galenic model, neither forecloses other possibilities with the insistence that has often become the rule in their followers. Particularly in the longer version of his argument, Laqueur is careful to delineate the strains within the model; in fact, part of his point is to show the ways in which even those resistant to the model nonetheless think in its terms. Greenblatt too insists, at least initially, on the "friction" between opposing medical models (Shakespearean Negotiations, 7879), though the latter end of his chapter tends to forget this insistence.

[10] Thomas Vicary, The Anatomie of the Bodie of Man, ed. Frederick J. Furnivall and Percy Furnivall, Early English Text Society, e.s., 53 (London: Oxford University Press, 1888; reprint, Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus, 1975), 76-77; this is a reprint of the edition of 1548 as reissued by the surgeons of St. Bartholomew—s in 1577. According to the Furnivalls ("Foretalk," vi), no copies of the 1548 edition and only one copy of the 1577 edition survive, which may indicate that the work was not widely disseminated.


[12] The model does occur in Juan Huarte's Examen de ingenios. The Examination of mens Wits, in which, by discouering the varietie of natures, is shewed for what profession each one is apt, and how far he shall profit therein, Englished by R. Carew (printed by A. Islip for R. Watkins, 1594; STC 13890), a work that might be considered quasi-medical insofar as it uses humoral theory in
its attempt to assign vocations to men according to the properties of their minds, originally for the benefit of the king of Spain (Aiii). Huarte invokes Galen in order to explain exactly how much coldness and moisture a woman should have in order to maximize the chances of producing wise children, "to which end," he says, "it behooueth first to know a particular point of Philosophy, which although in regard to the practices of the art, it be verie manifest and true, yet the vulgar make little reake therof. And from the notice of this, dependeth all that, which as touching this first point is to be deliuered: and that is, that man (though it seem otherwise in the composition which we see) is different from a woman in nought els (saith Galen) than only in hauing his genitall members without his body" (268-69). But this occurrence of the model suggests that it was far from determinative for Renaissance observers; Huarte clearly prides himself on knowing something that only the few know, something specifically different from what the vulgar see. (I owe this reference to Heather Dubrow, who has generously supplied me with bibliographic and other aid throughout this project.)

[13] Signatures are continuous throughout Banister's volume; folio numbers begin after the prefatory material ends, with the beginning of book i. I give signatures for the prefatory material, folio numbers for the later material, following the conventions of recto and verso for both signature and folio to avoid confusion.

[14] I am here reworking Greenblatt's famous--and beautifully crafted--sentence describing Duval's discovery of Marin le Marcis's penis: "empowered by the court of law, the physician reaches in behind the woman's secret fold of flesh and feels with his fingers end a swelling penis" (Shakespearean Negotiations, 77)--a sentence that might single-handedly account for the sexiness of the one-sex model.

[15] Paster's Body Embarrassed explicates a variety of ways in which the theory of humoral difference enforces gender difference; see esp. 79-83 for a critique of Laqueur's reading of humoral homology.

[16] By the time The Problemes of Aristotle was incorporated into Aristotle's Masterpiece in the eighteenth century, the homological model had found a home in it. See Vern L. Bullough, Sex, Society, and History (New York: Science History Publications, 1976), 99-100, for the Galenic model in this popular sex manual; see also Laqueur's similar citation of it (Making Sex, 4). But in its 1595 and 1597 incarnations, homology of sex organs is strikingly missing.

[17] According to Bullough, "at least twenty-six different printed versions of Problems are recorded before 1500.-- (Sex, Society, and History, 94). London editions in English in 1595, 1597, and 1603 testify to its continued popularity; I quote from the edition of 1597.
Problemes does locally assuage the sense of inevitable contamination attaching to menstruation as material cause by dividing menstrual blood into two kinds: "Question. Whether are the flowers which are expelled, & the flowers which the child is ingendred of, all one? Answer. No, because the one are unclean, and unfit for that purpose: but the other very pure and clean, and therefore that blood is fit for generation" (E5v). But given the repeated characterization of menstrual blood as venomous, and the insistence that woman's seed is red because it is made from corrupt menstrual blood, this one-time-only division does not carry much weight.

See Audrey Eccles, Obstetrics and Gynaecology in Tudor and Stuart England (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1982), 1112, for the publication history of The Byrth Of Mankynde. Richard Jonas had translated the Latin translation (De partu hominis) of Roesslin's German work in 1540; Raynold—s 1545 work, which draws on Jonas—s translation but augments it significantly, is the basis for all later editions of The Byrth of Mankynde. The spelling of Raynold—s name is contested; it is Raynal in Eccles and Raynalde in Joan Larsen Klein—s brief but useful introduction to her excellent selection of excerpts from Byrth [Daughters, Wives, and Widows: Writings by Men about Women and Marriage in England, 1500-1640 [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992], 177-79). I have followed the spelling on the title page of the 1545 edition for both author and title. Klein concludes from Raynolds's use of "stones" for ovaries that "he is following in part the old theory that the reproductive organs in women inversely mirror those of men" (179). Given that "stones" was the only terminology available and that Raynold declines to invoke the old homologies where we might most expect them, I disagree; here as elsewhere, "stones" seems to me a linguistic carryover that does not presuppose the whole of the one-sex model.

These are the listings in A. W. Pollard and G. R. Redgrave, A Short Title Catalogue of Books Printed in England, Scotland, and Ireland, 1475-1640 (London: Bibliographical Society, 1956); STC queries the 1585 date. Raynold is very self-conscious about the status of his work as potentially popular; see the prologue for his elaborate defense of its publication in English, despite the misuses to which it might be prone.

Raynold insists that his long section on anatomy—roughly one-third of the total length—is the necessary preface to an understanding of woman's reproductive functioning and its ailments and cures. This section—book 1—is his most striking addition to Jonas—s l540 edition.

Byrth, Hh.viiiir, or fol. 46r. I have used folio numbers (given in arabic numerals in the original) whenever possible in referring to Byrth, since signature markings are often missing. Both signatures and folio numbers sometimes get
scrambled in the 1545 edition; in addition, folio numbers start only at the conclusion of the prologue and often repeat (as they do here: this is in the second batch of pages in the 40s). Where the folio numbers are missing or confusing, I have used signatures. I have followed the conventions of recto and verso for both signatures and folio numbers to avoid unnecessary confusion.

[23] The status of the anatomical figures accompanying the various editions of Byrth is confusing. Editions of the 1545 Byrth available to me, for example, do not contain the combined masculine figures to which Laqueur refers (Making Sex, 111). Moreover, although Raynold (1545) describes male parts and apologizes for the maleness of his first and second figures, and although the 5–60 edition prides itself on correcting the sex of the 1545 figures, the 1545 text available on microfiche contains only two figures, labeled 1 and 2, and both distinctly female (the first is marked "Prima figurarum muliebrium" and is taken from Vesalius [see Laqueur, Making Sex, 111]; the second, with its long strand of hair and flayed breast, is even more decidedly female). But since Raynold's descriptions of his (female) third and fourth figures seem to apply to the figures labeled 1 and 2, and since he alludes to far more figures than appear in his 1545 text, there may have been a mis-match from the start, at least in some editions. (In 1545, he describes eleven figures in all; with the omission of the first two, his descriptions correspond roughly to the nine that appear in the 1560 edition and in later editions.) This already-confusing situation is made still more confusing by the omission of all the anatomical figures in the 1545, 1552, and 1560 editions on microfilm, despite detailed descriptions of them in the text (were they excised? if so, when and by whom?) Assuming that the 1545 figures sometimes were—or were intended to be—like those of the 1560 and later editions, what do they tell us about the hegemony of the one-sex model? Most were derived from Vesalius and appear in other anatomical texts (see, for example, Eccles, Obstetrics, plate 2, for Byrth's figures 3 and 9; see Laqueur, Making Sex, 81, 82, 84, for Byrth's figures 4 and 9). Byrth's figure 9, taken from Vesalius--s Fabrica, is in fact one of Laqueur--s prime visual examples of homology: "Here [the female genitalia] are not specifically arrayed, as in the Tabulae or the Epitome, to demonstrate that these structures are isomorphic with those of the male; they are just seen as such" (Making Sex, 82). This remarkably penis-like structure certainly seems to make a strong case for the one-sex model and presumably does so in the works Laqueur cites; but its status in Byrth and its descendants is far from clear. Oddly, the 1560 edition omits any description of it; and the 1545 description (like, for example, the 1598 description) focuses not on the extended (and hence apparently penis-like) neck of the womb but on the internal structure of the womb itself, opened up for our better viewing. In the absence of any reference to homology either in the text proper or in the description of this figure, we may question the extent to which it would have been "seen" as a penis, by Raynold or his audience; read from within Raynold's text, it might equally well have been seen as an illustration of his claim that the bottom of the matrix resembles a man's heart (see 36). The anatomical
figures clearly were passed around and attached to texts with quite different understandings of anatomical sex difference; without specific textual pointers, it seems to me dangerous to assume that we know what people in the Renaissance saw when they looked at them.

[24] Raynold is of course far from the first to attempt to qualify the sense that female anatomy is by definition imperfect; for discussion of this debate in the Renaissance, see Ian Maclean, The Renaissance Notion of Woman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 29-33. But Raynold may be among the first to make this argument on the basis of differentiation of function. According to Maclean, "after 1600, the vast majority of doctors reject these axioms [of isomorphism} in favour of the argument from specific sexual function," assigning each sex "an appropriately differentiated physiology"; he attributes the "earliest suggestion of such an approach" to Julius Caesar Scaliger—s possibly ironic 1557 attack on Cardano (33-34). Strictly speaking, an understanding of differentiated function depended on anatomical discoveries—especially of the female ovum—that were still in the future; but Raynold—s insistence on the different purposes of male and female seed, like his discussion of the fit between yard and womb port, seem to me to contain at least a suggestion of such an approach. If I read Raynold correctly here, he is significantly in advance of his continental colleagues.

[25] But see Paster for a reading of the ways in which Raynold—s language here may in fact reinforce the shame he is apparently trying to mitigate (Body Embarrassed, 186-87).

[26] Greenblatt distinguishes between then and now in part by distinguishing between teleological and genetic accounts of identity: if the (teleological) one-sex model finds its expression in the transvestite theater, "by contrast, a conception of gender that is symbolically female insists upon a genetic rather than a teleological account of identity, interests itself in the inward material matrix of individuality, and finds its supreme literary expression in the novel" (Shakespearean Negotiations, 88). Like The Problemes of Aristotle's account of hermaphrodites, Raynold's insistence on the importance of origins, especially of the literal matrix of material and maternal origins, suggests that Greenblatt's distinction—however compelling in itself—does not map conveniently onto the historical divide between transvestite theater and novel.

[27] The model is also absent from the brief anatomical section on the uterus in Edward Jorden—s A Briefe Discourse of a Disease called the Suffocation of the Mother (London, 1603), STC reel 757, C3r. Its absence is more surprising in Guillemeau, given that he was writing in France during the apparent heyday of
the one-sex model and was Par---s student (see Eccles, Obstetrics, 12.). The omission may signal Guillemeau's relative lack of interest in anatomy in this work rather than his lack of interest in the one-sex model: unlike Raynold, who insists on an anatomical foundation, Guillemeau fills his work with practical advice and anecdotes about occasions on which surgeons have saved the day. He does refer to one famous (and comic) form of homology, however: "Some do obserue, that the Nauell must be tyed longer, or shorter, according to the difference of the sexe, allowing more measure to the males: because this length doth make their tongue, and priuie membres the longer: whereby they may both speake the plainer, and be more seruiceable to Ladies. And that by tying it short, and almost close to the belly in females, their tongue is lesse free, and their naturall part more straite: And to speake the truth, the Gossips commonly say merrily to the Midwife; if it be a boy, Make him good measure; but if it be a wench, Tye it short" (Jacques Guillemeau, Child-birth, or The Happy Deliverie of Women [London: Printed by A, Hatfield, 1612], 99). See Heather Dubrow on the non-Galenic implications of a similar passage from Culpepper ("Navel Battles," 68-69).

[28] Presumably the trial surrounding the sensational transformation of Marie le Marcis to Marin le Marcis in 1601, as reported by Duval in his Des Hermaphrodites in 1603 (see Laqueur, Making Sex, 136-37) and Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, 73-75) reawakened interest in the Galenic model in England. But if the trial reanimated the apparently moribund model, it's worth asking what pressures, ideological or otherwise, gave that reanimation its force, since the story of the transformation itself need not have carried a Galenist moral (see, for example. Banister---s reading of such transformations, 28-29). Though Par--- gave a Galenist reading of the earlier transformation of Marie Gamier to Germain (see Laqueur, Making Sex, 126-27, and Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, 81), in the Essais---the source through which Marie's transformation was most likely to have become known in England---Montaigne reads it not through the lens of the Galenic model but as an instance of the power of imagination; in his extraordinary account, the incorporation of "this masculine member in girls" testifies not to genital homology but to the intensity of their desire for the penis, a desire that imagination rewards by providing them with one ("Of the Power of the Imagination," in The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald M, Frame [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965], 69; see also Laqueur, Making Sex, 128-29). In Parker---s important account of Montaigne's use of the story, whatever Galenist force it possesses is mitigated by the insistent fears of impotence and hence effeminization that surround it ("Gender Ideology," 343-50, 357-64).

[29] In my view, Crooke has been misrepresented in this matter: despite his strenuous refutation of the Galenic model, he tends to turn up in critical discourse as a proponent of it. See, for example, de Grazia, who cites him in support of the Galenic model ("Motive," 440), and Eccles, who quotes him out of context to
demonstrate that woman's imperfection was thought to be "a scientific fact" and overlooks his refutation of the homological model, instead citing Bartholin's, fifty years later, as evidence that the idea was on its way out by the late seventeenth century (Obstetrics, 26). Even Laqueur, who cites Crooke—s arguments against the model at some length, tends to emphasize the perversity of his anatomical reasoning rather than the fact that he disavows the model (Making Sex, 90). Recently, Orgel has argued that Crooke does not in fact disavow the Galenic model: "He has, in effect, one theory when his attention is focused on men, another when it is focused on women; the latter, though it contradicts and, indeed, to post-Enlightenment eyes ought to preclude the former, does not, in Crooke—s account, negate or even supercede it" (Impersonations, 22); "the scientific truth or falsehood of either theory is not at issue--the two claims are parts of two different arguments, and they are not in competition" (24). But this account seems to me not quite accurate. Crooke introduces homology first as part of his discussion of the need for generative parts (Microcosmographia, 199), not in his discussion of men specifically; he maintains it in his discussion both of men's generative parts (204) and of "the proportion of these parts both in Men and Women" (216). His first explicit refutation of homology comes not in his discussion of woman's generative parts but in question 8 of the Controversies to book 4 ("How the parts of generation in men and women doe differ"); it is repeated in question 1 ("Of the Difference of the Sexes," 270-72) of book 5, on the "Historie of the Infant." In other words, Microcosmographia sorts its theories only very inexactly according to focus on men or women. Nor is it content to make the two claims only as equally valid parts of two different arguments. After Crooke explicitly refutes the homological model, he never again embraces it. The terms in which he introduces the refutation of homology in book 5 suggest that he sees the theories very much in competition ("Notwithstanding all this, against this opinion there are two mighty arguments" [249]), and the triumphant series of marginal notations with which he concludes his discussion—"Aristot. Error," "Galen—s Error," "Disprooved," and "No similitude betwixt their Genitals"—suggest not only that he sees the arguments in competition but also that he expects the latter argument to negate and supercede the former. (Both truth-claims and combativeiseness are in fact commonplace in Crooke. See, for example, his dismissal of the idea that testicles don't make seed, in questions 2 and 3 of the Controversies to book 4: "We will therefore bid adue vnto Aristotle his faigned conceite"; "But the truth is that onely ignorance of Anatomy brought in this old wines tale" [24?]). While we should respect the untidiness of Renaissance argument that Orgel notes, I don't think that we need to see refutation by consecutive argumentation as a post-Enlightenment fallacy here.

[30] The womb is in fact unusually active—and male seed unusually inactive—in Crooke: the womb is the place "wherein [the] dull and sleepy faculties [of the male seed] may be raised and rowsed up" (258); "and that which was before but potentiall, it bringeth into act" (262).
[31] This revised understanding of woman's humoral deficiency seems to have been conventional in the early seventeenth century; it occurs again in William Whately's A Bride-Bush or A Wedding Sermon (London, 1617): "The woman is made to be fruitfull; and therefore also more moist and cold of constitution. Hence it is that their naturall heate serves not to turne all their sustenance into their owne nourishment; but a quantity redounding is set apart in a convenient place to chearish and nourish the conception" (44).

[32] Most of the books of the Microcosmographia are structured by an expository section followed by a (usually longer) set of controversies. Book 5 is an extreme instance: the expository section runs from 217 to 270; the "Dilucidation or Exposition of the Controversies concerning the Historie of the Infant"—thirty-three in all—runs from 270 to 345. (The extent to which Crooke's "Controversies" are in fact his is in doubt; he tells his readers inconspicuously in his "Preface to the Chyrurgeons" that he has taken the Controversies largely from Laurentius, with some "additions, subtractions, and alterations," and that book 5 is "almost wholly out of Laurentius sauing for some passages." Since Crooke nonetheless presents the controversies as his own, often citing Laurentius as though he were not translating from him, I have followed critical custom in referring to their author as Crooke.) By omitting Crooke's reference forward to the Controversies in the passage about stories of female to male transformation, Orgel minimizes Crooke's investment in sorting out "truelth"; Crooke returns to these stories in the passage cited below not as someone who "sees no need to reconcile the conflicting scientific arguments" (Impersonations, 22) but specifically to set the record straight ("what shall we say to those so many stories?" [250]).

[33] Laqueur points out that, after the "discovery" of the clitoris, this organ was routinely (if confusingly) assimilated to the one-sex model as another equivalent to the penis (Making Sex, 64-65, 92-93).

[34] Since like terminology is often taken to indicate homology of genital structure, it may be worth noting that Crooke uses the same terms—"testicles" and "spermatick vessels"—to describe male and female parts specifically in the process of discrediting the one-sex model. One might read this—as Laqueur does—as the failure even of its adversaries to free themselves from the model; or one might read it as an indication of a time lag between the development of a new model and the development of a new terminology.

[35] Most people accept Crooke at his—or his title page—word; but Carol Neely has called my attention to Jonathan Andrews's argument that he was only one of a number of physicians attached to the royal household rather than James's personal physician, as Microcosmographia advertised ("Bedlam Revisited: A History of Bethlem Hospital 1634-1770" [Ph.D. diss., Queen Mary...
and Westfield College, London University, 1991], 246). Though I was unable to follow up on all other suggestions, I have profited throughout from Carol Neely's wonderfully detailed and responsive reading of this essay.

[36] Orgel elegantly underscores the mismatch between the theorists of homology and the transvestite theater ("the medical theorists are for the most part French and Italian, and France and Italy did not develop transvestite theaters" ["Nobody's Perfect," 18]). But he nonetheless writes in this essay as though Galenic homologies unproblematically defined thinking about sexual difference in England, ignoring his own incipient critique (13); even in this essay's later incarnation in Impersonations he maintains that "outside the professional scientific community homology remained the predominant theory" (24).

[37] See Greenblatt, Shakespearian Negotiations, 88, and n. 26, above.

[38] See Suffocating Mothers, especially the discussions of Hamlet, King Lear, Macbeth, and Coriolanus.

[39] These instances are taken from Orgel ("Nobody's Perfect," 14, and Impersonations, 25) and Sinfield (Faultlines, 134). Among those who assume the "female" origin of men within the Galenic system, see also, for example, Carol Thomas Neely, "Constructing Female Sexuality in the Renaissance: Stratford, London, Windsor, Vienna," in Feminism and Psychoanalysis, ed. Richard Feldstein and Judith Roof (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 212-13; Susan Zimmerman, "Disruptive Desire: Artifice and Indeterminacy in Jacobean Comedy," introduction to Erotic Politics: Desire on the Renaissance Stage (New York: Routledge, 1992), 40; and Valerie Traub, Desire and Anxiety: Circulations of Sexuality in Shakespearean Drama (London: Routledge, 1992), 51. But a system defined by the teleological rather than the genetic does not readily point toward female origin; Parker (rightly, in my view) reads the fear of effeminization as a critique—rather than a confirmation—of the Galenic model insofar as it reverses the unidirectionality of the model (see "Gender Ideology," esp. 360-62).

[40] See Laqueur, Making Sex, 14-42, and Parker, "Gender Ideology," 338-33. Huarte seems to depart from his fellow-Galenists insofar as he entertains the possibility that the transformation can work in both directions: "if when nature hath finished to forme a man in all perfection, she would convuert him into a woman, there needeth nought els to be done, saue only to turne his instruments of generation inwards. And if she haue shaped a woman, and would make a man of her, by taking forth her belly and her cods, it would quickly be performed. This hath chanced many times in nature, aswell whiles the creature hath been in the mothers womb, as after the same was borne, wherof the histories are full" (Examination of Mens Wits, 169). But although he writes that these transformations can take place both before and after birth, Huarte is particularly
interested in in utero transformations, apparently because they explain cross-gender characteristics: "To whom this transformation hath befallen in the mothers womb, is afterwards plainly discovered, by certain motions which they retaine, vnfitting for the masculin sex, being altogether womanish, & in their voice shrill and sweet. And such persons are inclined to perform women’s actions, and fall ordinarily into vncouth offences. Contrariwise, nature hath sundrie times made a male with his genetories outward, and cold growing on, they haue turned inward, and it became female. This is known after she is borne, for she retaineth a mannish fashion, aswel in her words, as in all her motions and workings" (160-70). Moreover, whatever the theoretical possibilities of post-uterine transformation from male to female, the only male-to-female transformation Huarte describes is in utero (269), the only post-uterine transformation female-to-male (270). In practice, that is, Huarte follows traditional wisdom, combining a version of the Aristotelian position (that a man may become a woman in utero) with the Galenic position (that only a woman can become a man after birth).

[41] Orgel, "Nobody's Perfect," 14; see also Impersonations, 25, for a slight variant on this sentence ("In this version of the medical literature we all start as women").

[42] The assumption, for example, that our critical methodologies serve our psychological needs at the same time as they serve as signs of our attentiveness to ruling critical trends and to changes in the status of our knowledge.

[43] Among those who use the theory, Traub is exceptional in her insistence on consideration of this body; see, for example, Desire and Anxiety, 51-52.

[44] For early formulations of this thesis, see especially Madelon (Sprengnether) Gohlke, "I Wooed Thee with My Sword'; Shakespeare's Tragic Paradigms," in Representing Shakespeare: New Psychoanalytic Essays, ed. Murray M. Schwartz and Coppelia Kahn (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 170-87, and Coppelia Kahn, Man's Estate: Masculine Identity in Shakespeare (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); and see my Suffocating Mothers for a full account both of this psychic tension and of the numerous other feminist critics from whose work I have drawn.

[45] Given what we know of his reading habits, I would speculate that Shakespeare was far more likely to have encountered medical descriptions of generation through Plutarch's "Of the Naturlall Love or Kindnes of Parents to their Children" (in The Philosophie, Commonlie called The Morals, trans. Philemon Holland, "Doctor in Physicke" [London, 1603]) than through any of the specifically medical works; and, at least in this essay, Plutarch writes within the "wise nature" school akin to Raynold and Crooke.